The fallout from a number of Toyota automobile malfunctions, some of which pitifully tragic, has not yet shown its full scale and it remains unclear what repercussions it will have for the company and its executives, but management commentators start drawing initial lessons that can be learned from Toyota's response to the incidents.  Quite famously, the company reacted with a mix of sheepish reservation that shines through its actions and statements, which were strongly shaped by the philosophy of abstaining from comment until all the necessary facts become fully known, and outright responsibility it has agreed to shoulder in the form of gigantic recall decisions.  A high-profile organization with global operations and with a lasting reputation for excellence found itself driven against the wall by a series of compromising news reports and some of its key leaders yielded to instincts they should not have.  This chain of unfavorable events at Toyota serves as a prominent reminder of how essential it is for organizations, regardless of their present status, to retain vigilance, especially through participation in a customized executive program.     

As the latest research from Kellogg School of Management indicates, the critical decisions and reactions taken in the wake of a crisis situation or a business emergency are disproportionately significant for how a company's perception is affected.  As professors Adam Galinsky and Daniel Diermeier point out, a defensive approach, typified by Toyota's restrained no-comment policy in the early stages of the crisis, tends to be equated by the public with an attitude of defying responsibility and trying to marginalize the unsavory piece of news.  If this is how customers or business partners decode initial information coming from a beleaguered organization, they are likely to project a negative outlook well beyond this particular event in a process known as a spillover effect.  While experience teaches crisis management best, it is unrealistic to wait for emergencies to test the skills of decision-makers.  To stimulate a more proactive spirit among top management and to deepen their sensitivity to all crisis-related issues, joining a customized executive program that takes into account potential dangers and rehearses varied scenarios seems much apter and less costly.

It all may sound so familiar and, indeed, the idea of crisis management is hardly new or ground-breaking, but Toyota's troubles illustrate that no company, local or global, long established or relatively new to the market, might be entirely safe in the knowledge that something shelters it from an unexpected blow.  It has been replayed a number of times, at the level of public debate and at the level of individual organizations, but no company can afford to stay retroactive in relation to ongoing threats that the contemporary market continues to generate at incredible speed.  No other technique, short of going though a corporate catastrophe and experiencing it first hand, can improve organizational resistance to crisis fallout better than a customized executive program.