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China and the World in the 21st Century: It's about more than just economics

by Paul A. Tiffany

China and the World in the 21st Century: It's about more than just Economics


Paul Tiffany, Ph.D


No nation dominates forever.  This is, it might be noted, a positive outcome as such reshufflings are usually for the better.  Powerful states that fail to respond to citizen demands for improvement do not deserve to remain in positions of dominance, and history demonstrates that they typically don’t. In fact, the transition in power from one country to another over the past several centuries has resulted in the evolution of an improved national governance model that inspired hope to the world and offered the promise of a more bountiful and humane existence for all.  Such was the elevation to the top of both the United Kingdom in the 19th Century and the United States in the 20th.  While these two nations had, no doubt, their flaws— some more than trivial, any reasonable evaluation will find the pluses to far outweigh the minuses in both cases.  This is especially so when one compares them to other recent contenders to global preeminence, such as 20th Century Germany, Japan, or Russia.  The ideals of both the UK and the US remain today— despite post-9/11 aberrations— as the template for much of civilized life the world over.

But as the 21st Century unspools before us, we are once more faced with the potential of a global transition, and all indicators point towards a further westward tilt— this time, irrevocably it appears, to the People’s Republic of China.  Will the domination of China in the 21st Century also be marked by progress and hope for the rest of the world, wherein the global hegemon wielded her might not only for national benefit but as well for a greater universal good, a welcoming beacon of light that shines for all comers?  So far, the results should not incite much enthusiasm.  Indeed, the global triumph of China—were it to occur— suggests just the opposite, that is a retardation in human teleology that should be a point of concern to people throughout the world who either currently enjoy or willfully strive for political democracy, the rule of law, personal freedom, and participation in a global economic system characterized by free and fair trade for all. 

This is not to blindly condemn China for what it has accomplished in its rapid ascent up the economic ladder over the past thirty or so years.  The lifting from poverty of some 350 million people in a single generation is an achievement unprecedented in history. If nothing else, the overwhelmingly proud approval of the Chinese peoples for public policies that allowed for such a remarkable outcome is testament at least to their confirmation of the wisdom of the nation’s path forward.  The world as a whole has benefitted significantly from the willingness of Chinese workers to accept meager wage rates that have contributed to the expansion of consumption by many throughout the globe; the demand for materials  by the ever-expanding industrial infrastructure of China has created markets for firms everywhere (and incomes for their owners and employees); and the monetary policies of the government of the PRC have been a major contributor to a long period of low interest rates and low inflation that have materially assisted other nations to also  prosper, or at least until recently.  These are no mean feats and they deserve both global acknowledgement and gratitude.

But no ledger consists of only one column, and it is in the balance that we must seek to evaluate China’s overall contributions to date— and speculate about her future course of behavior.  Unfortunately, it is when one ventures outside the realm of internal economic growth that a less sanguine portrait emerges (and even that category is not without its problems).

In the political arena, the self-appointed government of the PRC continues to be its own worst enemy.  The constant suppression of its people’s desire for freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of communication and a right to an unimpeded search for knowledge, freedom of religious devotion, and freedom from almost pathological corruption by governmental officials from the top to the bottom is hardly inspiring to the world. 

Its policies towards those who engage in even the mildest forms of public complaint about official governmental policy are unconscionable.  Its attitude towards the rights of the accused, and of prisoners once convicted, is demonic.  Its attitude towards limitations of the rights of parents to bear children continues to rankle.

Its attitude towards environmental degradation— while showing nascent signs of at least some concern— nevertheless leaves much to be desired, as do uninhibited cultural tendencies that make a mockery of the preservation of declining and rare species of wildlife.  Its attitudes towards consumer product safety, working conditions in industrial plants and mines, and highway safety is downright frightening. 

Its claims towards nearby and disputably non-Chinese lands (such as the Spratleys, Arunachai Pradesh in India, and even the Korean Peninsula— to say nothing of Tibet) invite rightful skepticism about its expansionist intentions.  Its rapid military development and silence about long-term military goals creates not only suspicion but as well legitimate fears. 

And its mercantilist economic policies that blatantly manipulate its currency valuation, that restrict entry of foreign products and services to sectors that are dominated by the hugely inefficient but politically powerful SOEs, that tolerate if not encourage a culture of bribery and “connectionism” at all levels of business dealings, and its refusal to mount any kind of sustained and credible crackdown on the abduction of IP and other forms of legal digital commerce from suppliers the world over is simply criminal. 

Moreover, the Communist Party’s continued support, both direct and indirect, of some of the most despicable political regimes in the world today, in conjunction with an unwavering belief in both the infallibility and inalienable right of the CCP to monopolize all political discussion and decision making, simply courts danger— not only for China and its future, but also for a world that is becoming increasingly dependent on this nation for both global economic expansion and political stability that will allow that expansion to occur over a sustainable and peaceful path. 

By any reasonable reading of the ledger of China, the balance— no matter how favorable for the country itself— is becoming gravely negative for the rest of the world.  Are these the values that await us as China strides boldly forward, ever richer and ever more powerful on the global stage— a future colossus whose social, cultural, environmental, economic, judicial, and political norms are so distanced from the civilized mainstream of the past several centuries that its triumph would represent one of the great retreats from progress in history, modern or otherwise?

One might argue that China is evolving, that any comparison of the state today with its policies on key issues even some twenty years ago reveals a dramatic improvement and openness that can point only to further liberalization and convergence with the traditional ideals of modern society.  Yes, obviously improvements have occurred, as even a cursory visit to the mainland reveals a level of personal freedom that was unheard of in the 1970s.  But how deep and committed are these reforms, and how much do they reflect a willful path towards social change and not just the occasional loosening of shackles in areas that present no real threat to the status quo of official power?  The “reforms,” it too often appears, were simply the reluctant and residual outcome of a national leadership that has spiraled downward over time rather than one continuously building a foundation for positive social and political as well as economic progress going forward.

The evolution of China’s political leadership since Mao Zedong demonstrates a pattern that can only end in tragedy if it is not reformulated.  Mao may have been the visionary revolutionary, but crafting a durable state was hardly his best talent (something even the Chinese leadership reluctantly acknowledges today in its “70% good - 30% bad” report card on the man).  But Mao was followed by one of the great state-builders of modern times, Deng Xiaoping, who remains the true architect of the economic miracle that is modern China.  Jiang Zemin, his successor in turn, was clever enough to realize the brilliance of his predecessor and not to indulge in any radical rearrangements— and he did give at least verbal deference to notions of “inner party democracy” following the crisis of 1989.  But after that we have the current incumbent Hu Jintao, a somewhat timid and bureaucratic official who seems so worried about any challenges to any aspects of Party authority that he threatens to seriously impair if not outright undermine the progress initiated by Deng and nurtured by Jiang.  After an early but now moribund flirtation with local-level Party democracy, Hu has presided instead over a forceful turn to “centralism”— that is, a demand for unwavering support by all for the policies and actions of top Party officials.  This will likely be his epitaph when (presumably) he steps down in 2012, and little else.

Perhaps worse, the practice of the sitting President having the right to essentially appoint a successor simply begets an ever weaker line of succession, as the appointer— perhaps worried about impaneling someone who might revise or reverse policies of the prior regime— instead selects, in a strange reverse-Darwinian fashion, a man who would not likely pose such a threat.  There is some negotiation with Party kingpins on these matters, obviously, as such a critical decision cannot be made in absolute isolation; and to be sure it should be readily acknowledged that the Party— so far— has not tolerated one man endlessly clinging to power beyond the appointed ten year span.  What has no doubt enabled this process has been the strength of the Chinese economy, especially over the past seven or eight years. Remembering well the aftermath of the sharp 1988-1989 economic downturn— which many in the Party leadership attribute as a principal driver of the Tiananmen Square uprising— there appears little urgency by top officials to seriously question succession protocols at this time.  Hence both the reluctance to pursue reforms to the leadership selection process, or for that matter to question the inward focus of China’s economic policies— and perhaps instead opt for programs to spur global development as well.  Such a posture also sits well with the powerful entrepreneurial elite that has become fabulously wealthy in the past ten years, and who have learned to appropriately grease the skids of the Party apparatus to insure the durability of their own financial strength.

One can argue, as no doubt China apologists will, that the nation’s current policies are no different than were those of other great historical powers, the UK and the US included, in their climb to the top.  Certainly, in the US case, there is ample evidence in times past when America’s entrepreneurial class did wreak havoc upon the republic, seeking for itself a disproportionately larger share of the national wealth and appropriating vast political power without regard to ultimate social consequences.  But unlike China, the US had a system of governance that could ultimately (even if somewhat accidentally) produce a Theodore Roosevelt to counter the harsher tendencies of the unfettered American capitalism of the 1890s— a man hardly of the common class, yet so beholden to the seminal democratic values of the nation that his genealogical heritage and wealth was irrelevant to his commitment.

But where is China’s Roosevelt in this time of need?  As the gap between rich and poor widens further each year— precisely the kind of social and economic conditions that previously brought a Mao to power— there appears neither one person nor any significant organized force that might call into question the direction of the Party.  Can such a person emerge from China’s business elite?  Hardly, as the skills of business leaders the world over are seldom if ever well aligned with long-term political welfare, beyond purely short-term economic gain.  But as over 100,000 incidences of “social unrest” (read riots) continue to roil the rural peasantry annually, as an expanding and better educated urban middle class endures daunting corruption in nearly every facet of their lives (and not all petty), who will arise to inspire the necessary confidence in the state that governs them?  While the nation’s Premier fulminates about any external critique of his economic policies as simply trying to “hold China down,” where is the statesmanship and leadership that is necessary to keep this proud nation— which every day becomes more indispensible to global economic welfare— from ultimately careening off the tracks?  Victimization at the hands of “foreign devils” has characterized China’s international perceptions for generations, and the current regime shows no less commitment to this absurdist notion than its predecessors.

And yet today, due to the powerful and tightly binding sinews of economic globalization, we all hang in the balance of the policies and practices of that leadership.  To those who inform us that the West is dead, that its own quaint patterns of free markets, democratic values, and impartial justice have been outmoded by a planned economic system that generates ever higher metrics of growth and material consumption, I would invite them to attempt to publicly voice anti-Party comments in the People’s Republic of China today, or pursue other forms of every-day behavior that are standard practice in their home nations.  China’s citizens, as noted, appear to be genuinely grateful for their material uplifting since Deng’s revolution.  But they are also growing increasingly fretful and indeed hostile to a state governance system that seems incapable of serious and meaningful reform beyond the economic realm.  And so too are the nation states of the world becoming ever more frustrated with the export-led and undervalued-currency-fed economic policies of the PRC— and becoming more courageous in insisting that they alone cannot be held responsible for China’s need to rapidly urbanize and enrich its 900 million unhappy rural citizens in order to avoid further “social unrest.”  

As in almost all political systems, there are disparate voices calling for change, and within China’s leadership cabal it is no different; yet so far, the serious reformers are losing the battle.  But something ultimately is going to give, and if fundamental reforms are not forthcoming we will all pay the price— which should be justification enough for outsiders to question the nation’s internal machinations.  China’s “peaceful rise” is, in fact, an event that by and large should be welcomed by the world.  The potential for China’s contributions to worldwide advancement are immense— one need only recollect the rich heritage of the 14th Century Ming Dynasty to realize this.  To reiterate, no one nation has a claim on sole global proprietorship forever; it can also forfeit that privilege. 

But China’s rise must not be achieved at the cost of the basic rights and dignity that was the product of 250 years of human progress, nor at the expense of the ecosystem of the planet itself. Economic well-being, obviously, is something all people desire and demand.  But contentment doesn’t stop with one’s bank account— the evidence, in fact, is just the opposite.  Napoleon’s well-informed worries about “waking the sleeping giant” of China are taking on a new meaning within that nation today, and Party leaders will only court disaster if they do not pay heed to this rising challenge within their own midst. And so too will we.

 



Paul Tiffany is a Senior Lecturer at The Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.  He has taught in graduate business school programs in China for many years, and visits the country frequently with student groups. (January 2010)

 

Articles by
Paul A. Tiffany
Paul Tiffany is a Senior Lecturer at the Haas School of the University of California Berkeley. He teaches courses in competitive strategy business and public policy international management and...

Published 06/03/2010
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